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WHAT REMAINS OF PUBLIC CHOICE AND PARENTAL
RIGHTS: DOES THE VMI DECISION PRECLUDE EXCLUSIVE
SCHOOLS OR CLASSES BASED ON GENDER?
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia
Military Academy (VMI) violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it was a state-supported institution with a
male-only admissions policy. In a 7-1 decision (Justice Thomas recused
himself from the case),2 the Court held that the state failed to demonstrate
an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for barring women from VMI'
The decision further held that Virginia failed to remedy the constitutional
violation when it established a separate, but unequal, women's program at a
nearby all-women's college.4 Justice Scalia, in his dissent, lamented that this
decision threatens single-sex education in general.' Although the majority
did not rule that all publicly supported, single-sex education programs were
necessarily unconstitutional, Justice Scalia warned that would be the effect of
the decision, because few officials would be willing to risk the high cost of
a lawsuit and the high risk of losing.6
The VM decision raises several important issues for public schools. For
the past several years, some school districts around the nation have imple-
mented experimental pilot programs for students based on their race or sex.
Some programs are aimed at strengthening academics in response to concerns
about deficiencies in our public education system. Other programs focus on
building character because of a perception that today's youth lack self-respect
and respect for others. If Justice Scalia is correct, these innovative programs
may be in jeopardy if VM! is expanded and applied to public schools.
The most extensive experiment in single-gender classes is in Baltimore,
where boys and girls attend separate classes in more than a dozen schools.7
In California, Governor Wilson recently proposed single-gender public
schools;' and in his 1997-98 budget, there is a five million dollar appropria-
1. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
2. Justice Thomas' son, Jamal, attends VMI.
3. Vl, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-80.
4. In discussing the parallel program for women at Mary Baldwin College, the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), the majority held that "Virginia's remedy affords no
cure at all for the opportunities and advantages withheld from women who want a VMI
education... Virginia's remedy does not match the constitutional violation." Id. at 2286.
5. Id. at 2306.
6. Id. at 2305.
7. Janny Scott, Boys Only: Separate But Equal? Does Placing Black Youths in Their Own
Classes Help Them Do Better?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at Al.
8. Southern California Voices 1A Forum for Community Issues: Platform / Youth Opinion;
Same-Sex Public Schools: 'Boys and Girls Learn Differently,' L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1996, at
B7.
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tion for that purpose.9 In Detroit, a plan for all male academies was shut
down by threat of a lawsuit; instead, the school district implemented African-
Centered Academies, which are open to boys and girls.' In Savannah-
Chatham County, Georgia, the school district considered boys-only classes,
but opted instead, for "heritage immersion" programs." In Virginia,
Governor Allen appointed a strike force to review government operations,
including education, and recommended the state Department of Education
study the potential advantages of single-sex schooling.'2
The concern with these alternative programs is that they may promote
segregation and undo the progress that has been made towards equality in
education. Thus, tension exists between the Court's role in ensuring equal
protection on the one hand, and citizens' desire that their elected officials
remedy the deficiencies in public education on the other. Although education
has traditionally been a state function, the Court's holding in VM" makes it
more difficult for school districts to design and implement innovative
educational programs based on gender.
This Note examines the current state of the law relative to elementary
and secondary education in light of the VM decision. Specifically, where
does this leave public choice and parental rights regarding education?
Part One of this Note summarizes the VM" decision. It focuses on
Justice Scalia's dissent-particularly, his animosity toward a heightened test
for gender classifications and his prediction that single-sex education is dead.
To help put the VM" decision in context, Part One presents a case history of
the types of equal protection issues that the' courts have addressed with
respect to public education. By viewing the VM/ decision along an
evolutionary continuum, two issues emerge. First, there is the possibility that
today's popular experimental programs could result in segregated classrooms,
reverting to pre-Brown days. And second, there is uncertainty about the
proper level of review for cases involving gender classification.
Part Two examines the current state of the law governing gender
classifications in public education. A myriad of laws govern our public
education system from the United States Constitution to federal statutes, and
state laws. 3
9. Richard Lee Colvin, The Governor's 1997Budget, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at A3.
10. Valarie Basheda, Detroiters May Boycott the NAACP, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 9, 1991,
at B3.
11. Scott, supra note 7. Heritage immersion programs are multicultural programs geared
toward students in a particular community or school district. For example, schools in
predominantly Black, inner city areas would teach Black history as part of the curriculum and
would make extra efforts to attract black teachers to serve as role models. Other school districts
might have "Latino-centric" studies. Ultimately, the idea is to expand these programs to teach
about contributions made by all races and ethnic groups, and not cater to a single minority. Id.
12. Jon Glass, Separated, Boys and Girls May Learn Better; Controversial Approach Limits
Intimidation, Classroom Distractions, VA-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Jan. 4, 1995, at Al.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 § 901,
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1996); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 § 201, 20 U.S.C. §§
1701-1703 (1996).
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Part Three surveys different single-gender educational programs, whether
the segregation is intended when the program is initiated, or merely the
outcome of a pedagogical goal. This section demonstrates the variety of
forms single-gender programs can take.
Part Four compares and contrasts the alternative single-gender programs.
Here, the discussion focuses on why certain programs can pass constitutional
muster, while others cannot.
Finally, Part Five concludes that single-gender programs can exist and be
successful. Over the past several decades, sacrifices have been made to
achieve equal opportunities in education. Today, some school districts are
implementing innovative programs to improve public education and help
move young people into the twenty-first century. But in the process of going
forward, schools must be diligent and protect against equal protection
violations and taking steps backwards. In sum, Justice Scalia's concern over
the end of single-gender education is unfounded. For now, the VMI decision
seems to be limited to a situation where males could participate in a very
unique educational opportunity, while females had no opportunity for an
equivalent educational experience, not even one that came close.'
4
I. A LOOK AT THE PAST: EQUAL PROTECTION
ISSUES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection sounds simple:
"[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' 5  Yet more than one hundred years after its
ratification, it can be difficult to apply and its meaning remains open to
debate. The Supreme Court has identified three standards of review, or tests,
in applying the equal protection clause, ranging from deferential to strict.
The standard equal protection analysis applicable to most government
classifications asks whether laws that treat people differently serve a
legitimate state purpose. In other words, equal protection requires reason-
ableness in legislative and administrative classifications. 6 To provide
content, equal protection demands "some rationality in the nature of the class
singled out."' 7 "Rationality" is tested by the classification's ability to serve
the purposes intended by the legislative or administrative rule: 'The courts
14. In fact, Justice Ginsburg appeared to agree with amici that it might be appropriate for
the government to encourage diverse educational opportunities, including single-sex schools.
She seemed to leave the door open for such programs when she wrote, "[w]e do not question
the State's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities. We address
specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized... as 'unique .... .'" VMI, 116
Ct. at 2276 n.7.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW § 16-2, at 1439 (2d ed. 1988).
17. Id. at 1440 n.2 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966)).
3
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must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in
a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose .... ,18 Under the "rational
basis test," a law is upheld if the government shows a rational relationship
between the classification and a legitimate purpose. This test gives great
deference to legislative and administrative decisions. Most laws fall in this
category. 9
At the other extreme is the "strict scrutiny" test. Under this standard, a
law is upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest. Under strict scrutiny, the means to achieve the end must be narrowly
tailored and the Court will always consider whether less burdensome means
can achieve the same purpose. Race-based classifications are reviewed under
this standard.2
0
Between the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests is the "intermediate"
standard of review where a law will be upheld if it is substantially related to
an important government purpose. Historically, classifications based on
gender have been reviewed under this standard.2' In practice, the three
categories are not strictly adhered to, because equal protection analysis is
sometimes viewed along a continuum rather than three discrete categories.
One author of a well-known treatise noted that Court decisions under the
intermhediate standard "appear to be ad hoe judgments based upon justices'
perceptions of the gender classification at issue in each case.1 2
Whether one views equal protection standards of review as three discrete
categories or as classifications along a continuum, one issue stands out. Since
VM, it remains to be seen whether gender classifications will continue to be
subject to intermediate scrutiny as we have known it, or if the Court's use of
the term "exceedingly persuasive justification" signals a heightened form of
18. Id. at 1440 n.3 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)).
19. When legislation addresses a social or economic policy, a court can reasonably conclude
of a reasonable public purpose for the classification: New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding a New York City personnel policy which precluded known
methadone users from being employed by the transit authority); Railway Express v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding a New York traffic regulation which banned ads on commercial
vehicles but not on owner-operated vehicles); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)(upholding an Oklahoma statute prohibiting opticians from fitting eyeglasses without a new
prescription, but exempting ready-to-wear eyeglass distributors); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota law banning plastic milk containers
while encouraging use of paper cartons).
20. Some examples of classifications that are subject to strict scrutiny are ethnic and
national origin classifications, and classifications affecting fundamental rights.
21. The Court established the intermediate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications
in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the
sale of 3.2% "near beer" to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18, even
though statistics showed that males had a higher incidence of alcohol-related driving arrests).
The Court held that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
22.. ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, TREATIsE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE &
PROCEDURE § 18.23, at 277 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996).
[Vol. 33
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the test.23
B. A Case History-Equal Protection and Education:
The Debate is Still Going Strong
It is virtually impossible to apply an originalist's interpretation" to the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to education. In 1868, who could
predict the role of formal education in our society? By 1954, however, its
importance was clear. In its landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka," the Court recognized that:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship....
[it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. "'
Even before Brown, the Court decided in Sweatt v. Painter27 that "equal
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of
inequalities." In Sweatt, the plaintiff was denied admission to the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School simply because of his race. 'When the state
established a parallel law school for Blacks, the Court compared the offerings
of the two facilities29 and found that they were not substantially equal.3"
While the tangible features of the two schools were found to be unequal, the
Court placed great emphasis on certain intangibles "incapable of objective
measurement."3 The Court held that the equal protection clause required
23. The "exceedingly persuasive justification" language was used in Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) without raising the same concerns as the VMI decision.
See discussion infra note 45 and accompanying text.
24. An originalist is one who believes he knows the intent of the drafters of the Constitution
and, thus, can interpret the Constitution according to their original intent. GEOFFREY R. STONE
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-86 (3d ed. 1996).
25. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
26. Id.
27. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
28. Id. at 635 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
29. Id. at 632. Among the Court's considerations were the University of Texas Law School
had a faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, a student body of 850, a library
of more than 65,000 volumes, and was considered one of the nation's top-ranked law schools.
The newly established law school for Negroes had five full-time faculty members, a student body
of 23, and a library of 16,500 volumes; moreover, the school lacked accreditation. Id.
30. Id. at 633.
31. Id. at 634. Some advantages of the University of Texas Law School were reputation
of the faculty, experience of the administration, the influential alumni network, and the school's
standing and prestige in the community. Id.
5
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that the plaintiff, Mr. Sweatt, be admitted to the University of Texas Law
School.32
In a more modem case, the Court was given an opportunity to decide
whether the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. require every public school,
in every public school system in the nation, be coeducational. In
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia,33 a female high school student
was denied admission to an all-male academic high school. In Philadelphia,
the school district offered four types of senior high schools: academic,
comprehensive, technical, and magnet. There were two academic schools,
one for males and one for females. These schools, which offered college
prep curriculums, were not neighborhood based; they accepted students from
throughout the city. The Third Circuit held that where attendance at either
of the two gender-segregated public high schools was voluntary, and
educational opportunities offered at the two schools were essentially equal,
admission requirements based on gender classification did not violate the
equal protection clause.34 On appeal, without writing an opinion, an equally
divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court (Justice
Rehnquist did not participate).3"
The Third Circuit ruled that the Philadelphia School District provided
excellent educational facilities for both sexes, that there was a legitimate
educational policy being served by having single-sex high schools, and that
the primary aim of the school system is to provide a high quality educa-
tion.36 The court did not decide the "wisdom of segregating boys and girls
in high school";3 7 they were concerned with the constitutionality of such a
plan and found "once that threshold has been passed, it is the school board's
responsibility to determine the best methods of accomplishing its mission. ''38
In dissent, Circuit Judge Gibbons was incredulous. He compared the
voluntariness and equality of this dual system to a "twentieth-century sexual
32. Id. at 636.
33. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887-88.
37. Id. at 888.
38. Id. But see EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT ISSUES, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUBLIC
EDUCATION: ISSUES INVOLVING SINGLE-GENDER SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS 13 (1996)
[hereinafter GAO]. In 1983, female students again sought admission to Central High School and
sued in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County. The court ordered the admission of
the girls to Central. The court found that Vorchheimer did not bar this claim because of
inadequate representation by plaintiff's counsel in Vorchheimer. In Vorchheimer, plaintiff's
counsel did not disclose evidence to the court, which was relevant here. For example, the boys'
school was almost three times larger, its library had about twice as many books, the boys'
school had a computer lab, and its graduates received almost twice the amount of money for
college scholarships. Central High School is currently coeducational; the High School for Girls
is open to students of both sexes, but no boys are enrolled. Id.
254 [Vol. 33
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equivalent to the Plessy decision."39 Judge Gibbons wrote, "The majority
opinion ironically emphasizes that Vorchheimer's choice of an academic high
school was 'voluntary.' It was 'voluntary,' but only in the same sense that
Mr. Plessy voluntarily chose to ride the train in Louisiana.'" °
Another case often relied on in discussing gender classifications and
education is the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan.4" In that case, Mr. Hogan, a registered nurse, applied for
admission to the Mississippi University for Women (MUW) School of
Nursing with the intent of earning a Bachelor's degree. Since its founding
in 1884, MUW School of Nursing was a state-supported women's school and
the only state-supported nursing school in Columbus. While the school
would not allow Mr. Hogan to enroll for credit, it did allow men to audit
classes; thus, the school was not, strictly speaking, a single-gender nursing
school.
The state defended its admissions policy on the grounds that its program
compensated for discrimination against women and was an educational
affirmative action program.42 Unpersuaded, the Court used the predomi-
nance of women in the nursing profession as evidence that affirmative action
was unnecessary.43 Moreover, the Court found that MUW's policy of
excluding men perpetuated the stereotypical view of nursing as a woman's
job.44 Finding that the state failed to establish an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" to sustain the gender-based classification, the Court held that
MUW's policy of denying males admission to the School of Nursing for
credit violated the equal protection clause.45
A review of these cases leading up to the present time demonstrates the
issues that courts have been asked to address relative to public education.
Thus, the VMT case was not so unique, as it encompassed many of the same
concerns: the importance of education, the concept of separate but equal, and
the true meaning of choice. In VMJ, the Supreme Court concluded that
single-sex education has pedagogical benefits and diversity in public
education can serve the public good.46 However, the Court said "without
39. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 889.
40. Id. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Mr. Plessy (seven-eighths white, but
"colored" nonetheless) was prosecuted under a Louisiana statute when he refused to vacate a
railroad car reserved for Whites. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
which required railroad companies to provide separate but equal accommodations for White and
colored races.
41. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
42. Id. at 727. Claiming to be an affirmative action program would place this program
within a lawfully-accepted exception which allows remedial action for past discrimination.
43. Id. at 729.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 731. In its rationale, the Court hinted at a heightened form of intermediate
scrutiny when it required the state to show "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the
challenged classification.
46. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. The Court cited Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995); and J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7
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equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on
race or national origin,4" the Court... has carefully inspected official action
that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men)." '4
In over twenty cases since 1971, government classifications based on sex
have been subjected to heightened scrutiny evidencing a "strong presumption
that gender classifications are invalid."49 Thus, more than forty years after
Sweatt and Brown, questions of equal protection in public education are still
being decided. Yet, while racial classifications are clearly subject to strict
scrutiny, the application of intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications is
less clear and court holdings provide little guidance for future decisions.5 °
The issues today demonstrate that this is a very unsettled area of law, open
to broad interpretation and debate.
C. Old Traditions Die Hard-U.S. v. Virginia
1. VMI Procedural History
The Supreme Court's 1996 VMf decision culminated a six-year battle for
gender equality in education in Virginia. In 1990, a female high school
student filed a complaint with the Justice Department alleging an equal
protection violation because of VMI's male-only admissions policy.5' The
District Court rejected the equal protection claim and ruled in favor of
VMI.52 Applying the intermediate scrutiny test,53 the District Court found
47. Id. at 2275 (citing Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)).
48. Id. (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)).
49. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 152 (1994).
50. Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 6, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)
(No. 94-1941), available in 1995 WL 703392. Amici supported the U.S. government's
arguments and urged that the Court apply strict scrutiny to classifications based on gender, in
general, and to the VMI case, in particular. In their brief, amici cited numerous cases where
lower courts were confused in trying to apply the intermediate scrutiny test: Lamprecht v. FCC,
958 F.2d 382, 398 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (referring to intermediate scrutiny as indeterminate);
Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 931 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e are cognizant of
the problems with intermediate scrutiny"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 939 (9th Cir.
1987) ("[intermediate scrutiny] provides 'relatively little guidance in individual cases'") (citation
omitted); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (1st Cir. 1977) (calling intermediate scrutiny
"hardly a precise standard"), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa.
v. City of Phila., 735 F. Supp. 1274, 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (asserting that intermediate scrutiny
provides little guidance to courts in decision making); Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F.
Supp. 1319, 1335 n.22 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("[Intermediate scrutiny does] not provide definite
guidance... decisions may appear inconsistent and unprincipled").
51. VMl, 116 S. Ct. at2271.
52. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
53. The court noted that,
The party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification for
the classification. The burden is met only by showing at least that the discrimination
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
[Vol. 33
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that "VMI's single-sex status and its distinctive educational method represent
legitimate contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher education system,
and that excluding women is substantially related to this mission."'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court held that VMI's policies violated the
equal protection clause. The District Court's judgment was vacated, and the
case was remanded. The state was given the following options: admit
women to VMI, establish parallel institutions or programs, or give up state
financial support and become a private institution." In response, Virginia
agreed to initiate a parallel women's program at Mary Baldwin College,
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), which was approved. 6
Challenging the establishment of a separate women's program, the U.S.
sought certiorari and it was granted.
2. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court held that while maintaining VMI for men only,
Virginia failed to provide any "comparable single-gender women's institu-
tion."'57 Adopting the language from Judge Phillips' dissenting opinion from
the Court of Appeals, the Court said, "the Commonwealth has created a
VWIL program fairly appraised as a 'pale shadow' of VMI in terms of the
range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni
support and influence."5"
Although the majority did not say that publicly supported, single-sex
education programs were inevitably unconstitutional, that is how Justice
Scalia viewed the holding: "Under the constitutional principles announced
and applied today, single-sex public education is unconstitutional." '59
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)).
54. Id. at 1413.
55. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992). Arguably, by electing
to become a private institution, VMI could continue its male-only admissions policy without
being scrutinized under the equal protection clause.
56. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994).
57. VMl, 116 S. Ct. at 2285 (citing United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4th Cir.
1995)). The Court considered tangible differences between VMI and VWIL (physical facilities,
faculty, course offerings) and intangible differences (VMI's 157-year old history, name
recognition and prestige, and its influential alumni network).
58. Id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1250).
59. Id. at 2305.
9
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3. Justice Scalia's Dissent
This landmark decision put an end to the institution that was known as
VMI and its 157-year-old tradition of producing "citizen-soldiers." ' Justice
Scalia, in his lone dissent, lamented:
[T]he rationale of today's decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifica-
tions, a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable
from strict scrutiny ... regardless of whether the Court's rationale leaves
some small amount of room for lawyers to argue, it ensures that single-sex
public education is functionally dead. The costs of litigating the constitu-
tionality of a single-sex education program, and the risks of ultimately
losing that litigation, are simply too high to be embraced by public officials
.... No state official in his right mind will buy such a high-cost, high-risk
lawsuit by commencing a single-sex program.
In his discussion of the three tests used in equal protection jurisprudence,
Justice Scalia noted that they are abstract, but necessary. In applying the
tests, he cautioned that the Court's role was to preserve society's values, not
revise them.62 In the context of VMI's admissions policy, Justice Scalia
wrote that "when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill
of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and
unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have
no proper basis for striking it down."63 Of course, this reasoning can be
attacked by analogy. Many practices that were acceptable when our nation
was first founded are not tolerated today.'
To make his point and demonstrate the majority's boldness in arriving at
its decision in VAf, Justice Scalia pointed out that the U.S. service academies
admitted women in 1976 "not by court decree, but because the people
through their elected representatives, decreed a change., 65 Consequently, he
blasted the Court's decision and said the VMi" holding forced change upon
Virginia "not by democratic processes but by order of this Court... the
Court favors current notions so fixedly that it is willing to write them into the
Constitution of the United States by application of custom-built 'tests.' This
is not the interpretation of a Constitution, but the creation of one. 66
60. Id. at 2276. VMI was founded in 1839 with a mission to produce "citizen-soldiers,"
men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. VMI pursues its mission
through an adversative training program which includes physical and mental stress, lack of
privacy, and absolute equality of treatment. While recognizing that there might be some
pedagogical value in a single-sex education, the Court found that the state failed to show
exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from this program.
61. Id.' at 2306.
62. Id. at 2292.
63. Id. (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990)).
64. For example, anti-miscegenation laws were not ruled to be unconstitutional until 1967,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
65. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2293.
66. Id.
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What Justice Scalia was referring to was the Court's repeated reference
to a requirement that the state show an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
in support of its male-only admissions policy at VMI. While the United
States urged the Court to apply the strict scrutiny test in VM', 67 the Court
treated the matter as a closed issue.68  Although the Court reiterated the
intermediate scrutiny standard as established in Hogan,69 Justice Scalia
interpreted the use of this particular language to indicate a heightened form
of intermediate scrutiny, in effect, imposing an additional requirement into the
test to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification." In Justice Scalia's
view, this represented a divergence, for all practical purposes, in the level of
scrutiny applied to classifications based on gender.7"
4. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Concurrence
Chief Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's analysis in his
concurring opinion. He stated, "to withstand constitutional
challenge... classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." ' Continuing, he wrote,
While the majority adheres to this test today, it also says that the State must
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to support a gender-
based classification. It is unfortunate that the Court thereby introduces an
element of uncertainty respecting the appropriate test. While terms like
"important government objective" and 'substantially related" are hardly
models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification."'
5. Summary
While Justice Scalia's opinion should not surprise anyone familiar with
his originalist view of Constitutional interpretation, it is a warning to public
school administrators. Although the VIf decision does not render publicly
supported, single-sex education programs unconstitutional, Justice Scalia
believes that any alternative school program that classifies students according
to sex will be subject to a standard that is "utterly impossible of achieve-
67. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, U.S. v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available in 1996 WL 16020
[hereinafter Transcript].
68. Id. at 13-14.
69. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2271 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982).
70. See Anita K. Blair, The Equal Protection Clause and Single-Sex Public Education:
United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute, 6 SFrON HALL CONST. L.J. 999 (1996)
(raising concerns over subjecting gender classifications to strict scrutiny).
71. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
72. Id.
11
Peter: What Remains of Public Choice and Parental Rights: Does the VMI D
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1996
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW[
ment."
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW GOVERNING
GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972'4
Title IX prohibits gender discrimination in public elementary and
secondary education. Passed as part of an amendment package to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title IX states that "No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance... ."I' Single-sex public education
at the elementary and secondary levels may violate Title IX if school districts
fail to provide comparable facilities, courses, and services to both boys and
girls.
7 6
During oral arguments in VMI, the question was raised whether Title IX
was applicable to the case.71 Title IX was not applicable because VMI fit
within an exception for undergraduate institutions of higher education that
have traditionally and continually had a policy 6f admitting only students of
one sex.
78
In conjunction with the Education Amendments of 1972, the Department
of Education promulgated regulations effectuating Title IX. 79 While Title
IX does not preclude a school district from having single-gender schools, the
implementing regulations generally prohibit single-gender classrooms in
coeducational schools."0 Specifically, a recipient of federal financial aid
"[s]hall not, on the basis of sex... [p]rovide different aid, benefits, or
services or provide aid, benefits, or services in a different manner."'" While
73. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2306. Justice Scalia used these words to describe the burden of
demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for gender classifications.
74. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1996).
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Federal funding is a primary factor in determining whether a
program may create classifications based on gender. But see Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for
Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1994) (discussing the legitimate
social goals and governmental interest in single-gender public education as part of diversified
educational opportunities and why government funding should not be the deciding factor in
judging the constitutionality of single-sex educational programs).
76. 34 C.F.R. § 106.35(b) (1996).
77. Transcript, supra note 67, at 38-40.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) states, "Public educational institutions with traditional and
continuing admissions policy: in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public
institution of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex,
79. 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1996), Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs
and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance.
80. GAO, supra note 38, at 7.
81. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2) (1996).
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dictating that courses may not be carried out separately on the basis of sex, 2
the regulations do permit certain exceptions allowing for certain types of
single-sex classes. For example, students may be grouped in physical
education classes by ability;83 students may be separated by sex within
physical education classes while participating in contact sports;84 elementary
and secondary school students may be separated by gender for sex-education
classes;85 and students may be separated based on vocal range which may
result in single-gender choral groups.8 6
While single-gender classes are generally unacceptable, Title IX allows
affirmative action to overcome "the effects of conditions which resulted in
limited participation by persons of a particular sex."87 Under the affirmative
action provision, classifications that result in single-sex classes must be
directly related to the reasons for having the single-gender programs. Thus,
(1) beneficiaries of the single-gender programs must have had limited
opportunities to participate in a school's activities because of their sex, (2)
less restrictive means to achieve the goals of the single-gender programs must
have been considered and rejected, and (3) there must be evidence that the
intended results of single-gender programs could not be accomplished through
comparable sex-neutral programs.88
Therefore, while Title IX bars discrimination on the basis of gender in
any publicly-funded program, it does not directly forbid admissions policies
based on gender. And, while gender-classifications may be an acceptable
means of affirmative action, single-gender programs must be narrowly
tailored to achieve specific goals.
B. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 197489
The Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) applies to elementary
and secondary schools and, for the most part, parallels Title IX. Apparently
passed by Congress in response to racial discrimination, it is not clear that
Congress even intended it to specifically address sex segregation in public
schools.9" It is a policy of the U.S. that "all children enrolled in public
82. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (1996).
83. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) (1996).
84. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c) (1996).
85. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(e) (1996).
86. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(f) (1996).
87. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) (1996), remedial and affirmative action and self-evaluation.
88. GAO, supra note 38, at 22.
89. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 § 201, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (1996).
90. The language that is relevant to the issue of single-gender public education is a bit
confusing because it does not consistently use "sex" as a classification:
Legislative history indicates that Congress passed the EEOA with the specific intent
to remedy the last vestiges of intentional racial discrimination in school systems, and
that the issue of sex segregation did not arise in congressional debates. One
13
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schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race,
color, sex, or national origin .... "91 Furthermore, Congress found that
students were denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when
dual school systems were based "solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or
national origin."92 Likewise, individuals cannot be denied equal educational
opportunity because of race, color, sex, or national origin, by educational
agencies that deliberately segregate students among or within schools on the
basis of race, color, or national origin.93currently Note that this part of the
law prohibiting deliberate segregation does not include "sex" as a forbidden
classification. Thus, it appears that Congress did not intend to prohibit
single-sex education. Rather, it seems that students may voluntarily choose
single-sex classes or schools. In construing this statute, however, it is unclear
whether the inclusion of "sex" in some places, while omitting it in others,
was intentional, or merely an oversight in legislative drafting.
III. A SURVEY OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
While many people today would agree that our public schools must be
reinvented to elevate standards and raise student achievement levels, there is
disagreement over how best to accomplish these goals. Some education
experts believe the difficulties facing U.S. public education may be traced to
the traditional design of our schools-from the way they are structured to the
way they are operated.94 Others view the problem as part of a larger one
of ethnic and socio-economic changes in our culture, compounded by the
explanation for the EEOA's partial inclusion of sex is that it was intended only to
combat racial discrimination manifesting itself through the sex segregation of
elementary and secondary schools. Sex segregation became common in the south
after Brown, as a way to comply with racial integration orders but still keep black
boys and teachers away from white girls.
Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy At the Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling
Single-Sex Education With Equal Protection, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 637, 675 (1993) (citing
Robert B. Barnett, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 296 (1970)).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1).
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (emphasis added).
94. CHESTER E. FINN, JR., DIFFERENT SCHOOLS FOR A BETTER FUTURE 4 (Hudson
Briefing Paper No. 193, 1996). Chester Finn believes that school systems that still prepare
some students for college and others for blue-collar jobs is obsolete in an age where just about
everyone needs to possess academic knowledge and practical skills, including computer literacy.
Additionally, school programs are archaic because they do not take advantage of what research
has taught us about effective organizational and instructional arrangements. He believes that
schools need to pay more attention to modem technology and the changing nature of family and
community life. He says the traditional school design does not meet individual's or society's
needs. For example, the 180-day school calendar was implemented to facilitate crop harvests;
schools were shut down during the summer months before air conditioning was invented; the
five-to-six hour school day was more appropriate when children went home after school to find
their mothers waiting for them.
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explosion of information and technology.95 Still, others see American
education as a "mess,"96 and liken school yards to combat zones." This
latter view may not be an exaggeration. The California Department of
Education compared teachers' complaints in the 1940s with those in the
1990s. In the 1940s, major problems in California schools were chewing
gum, wearing inappropriate clothes, and getting out of turn in line.9" Today,
the problems range from drug and alcohol abuse, to pregnancy and suicide,
to gang warfare and murder.99 Frankly, it is no wonder that some school
districts are willing to try just about anything to take back their schools and
focus on education and good citizenship.
Public education in the United States must also be viewed in the larger
context of international competitiveness. An international assessmentof math
skills among thirteen-year-olds found that students in the United States scored
below four countries and four Canadian provinces participating in the
study.' Korean students scored the highest with an average score of 567.8
compared to American students with a 473.9 average.' 0' In the same
survey, American students placed ninth in scientific knowledge among the
twelve nations and provinces that participated.' 2
In the United States, standardized test results show that girls begin school
outperforming boys in almost all areas.' °" Girls finish elementary school
surpassing boys on every standardized test in every academic subject except
science, where boys have a slight lead.' 4 In middle school, girls' test
scores, relative to boys', begin to drop and the decline continues through high
school. 05 The small lead that boys enjoyed in science widens, becoming
a gap; and the longer girls stay in school, the further behind they fall,
95. Id. at 2.
96. JOSEPH FERNANDEZ & JOHN UNDERWOOD, TALES OUT OF SCHOOL 1 (1993).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. Ranked in order, problems in the 1940s were (1) talking, (2) chewing gum, (3)
making noise, (4) running in the halls, (5) getting out of turn in line, (6) wearing improper
clothes, and (7) not putting trash in trash cans. Id.
99. Id. In the 1990s, the problems are ranked as (1) drugs, (2) alcohol, (3) pregnancy, (4)
suicide, (5) rape, (6) robbery, (7) assault, (8) burglary, (9) arson, (10) bombings, (11) murder,
(12) absenteeism, (13) vandalism, (14) extortion, (15) gangs, (16) abortion, and (17) sexually
transmitted diseases. Id.
100. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE
GIRLS: A STUDY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON GIRLS AND EDUCATION 25 (1992).
101. Id. (citing A. LAPOINTE ET AL., WORLD OF DIFFERENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE (1989)).
102. Id. at 26.
103. MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
CHEAT GIRLS, 13-14, 137-38 (1994).
104. Id. at 138.
105. Id.
15
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especially in math and science.1 6
Recent studies are persuasive in showing that there may be pedagogical
value in single-gender education. Some educators believe that boys achieve
more in single-sex schools, concentrate more on their studies, and express
themselves more freely in all-male classes.'0 7 Conversely, others believe
a coeducational environment is more like the real world, therefore, more
valuable for boys and girls.'08 While the benefits of an all-male education
are less certain," 9 research indicates that schools without boys seem to be
good for girls."0 Compared to girls in coeducational schools, girls in
single-sex schools have higher self-esteem, are more interested in nontradi-
tional subjects, and achieve more in higher education and careers.",
Though not conclusive, studies and statistics provide some evidence that
single-gender education may be substantially related to an important
government purpose. If one believes that education is an important
government function, and that the government has a vested interest in having
highly educated and skilled citizens, then single-gender education is not
unconstitutional if the gender classifications are substantially related to
pedagogical goals.
A. Single-Gender High Schools
One of the oldest single-gender educational concepts in the United States
is the all-male or all-female school. Today, about nineteen percent of
nonreligious independent schools are single sex compared with about sixty-
two percent in the 1960s." 2  Similarly, during the 1960s, one hundred
percent of Catholic schools were single sex, but now more than half are
106. Id. An underlying premise of the Sadkers' work is that differences in achievement
levels between male and female students is the result of unequal treatment they receive in the
classroom from their teachers. For example, boys get more of their teachers' attention either
because they raise their hands more often or blurt things out; or they require more attention
because they tend to be less disciplined than the girls. Thus, the Sadkers' view would emphasize
teacher training and awareness to overcome classroom discrimination, rather than single-gender
educational programs to combat academic deficiencies.
107. Id. at 239-40. Boys in single-sex schools also seem to have a better appreciation for
nontraditional subjects like literature and art. However, these positive generalizations are
tempered by an observation that all-boys' schools may also encourage sexist views. Id. at 240-
41.
108. Id. at 248.
109. Id. at 239-40, 248.
110. Id. at 233, 248.
111. Id. at 233. Often, the success of single-sex schools and women's colleges is attributed
to role models and mentors. Some education experts believe that single-sex high schools help
girls get through periods of low self-esteem during adolescence. A nationwide survey of
alumnae from all-girls' schools across the nation reported that single sex schools helped them
develop self-confidence, assertiveness, and a strong sense of identity. Graduates from women's
colleges earn more degrees in economics, life science, physical science, and math; they are two
to three times more likely than their coeducational peers to enter medical school; they are well
represented in Fortune 500 companies and in high government positions. Id.
112. Id. at 232.
[Vol. 33
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 33 [1996], No. 2, Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol33/iss2/11
1997] DOES VMT DECISION PRECLUDE SCHOOLS BASED ON GENDER? 265
coeducational.' 3 Today, single-sex private schools are less of a factor in
the educational system, and they are illegal altogether in the public school
system, with some narrow exceptions.
14
0 In 1992, the Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, investi-
gated a complaint that Baltimore's Western High School was excluding boys
from admission." 5 The high school was initially established in 1844 to
provide girls an education beyond elementary school. During the 1960s, the
school focused on college preparation; today about ninety-six percent of its
graduates go on to college." 6 Western is one of ten citywide high schools
in Baltimore which attracts students from the entire city." 7 Students must
have a B average to be admitted and a C average to remain enrolled. The
student population at Western is racially and ethnically diverse."' School
brochures do not advertise a girls only school, and applications are evaluated
on merit, without regard to sex.' 9
The Office of Civil Rights found no Title IX violation at Western. The
investigators found that Western's program was not unique because similar
programs were available to students of both sexes at other citywide high
schools.120  Moreover, there was no evidence that boys were prohibited
from applying or attending Western High School.'
The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights also investigated
a complaint that boys were being denied admission to Philadelphia High
School for Girls.' The Philadelphia High School for Girls opened in 1818
as a coeducational teacher's training school and in 1848 it became the Girl's
Normal School. By 1992, the school was one of nine magnet high schools
in Philadelphia, which encourages all students to apply, regardless of
gender." The school admits students from all over the city and reflects
school district demographics: about forty-four percent of the students are
from families below the poverty line.'24 The school offers an "academic
enrichment curriculum" and extracurricular activities and attracts students
with high academic performance and good attendance records." Currently,
113. Id. at 232-33.
114. Id. at 232. Under Title IX, public schools may not classify students according to
gender except under very limited circumstances. See discussion supra notes 82-88 and
accompanying text.
115. GAO, supra note 38, at 8.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Students represent about thirty national and ethnic groups and about eighty percent of
the students are African-American. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 9.
122. Id. at 8.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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about ninety-eight percent of the school's graduates go on to college.2 6
At the completion of its investigation, the Office of Civil Rights
concluded that no Title IX violation existed. The school district had no
policy of excluding males from Philadelphia High School and eight other
magnet schools in the city offered equivalent programs.'27
B. All-Male Academies
An educational concept making a comeback in the 1990s is the "male
academy," '28 intended to focus on special needs of young males, particu-
larly those growing up in inner cities. 29 In 1991, the Detroit School
District tried to establish three male academies to serve about 250 boys from
preschool through fifth grade. 3' The school district planned to phase in
similar programs for grades six to eight over the next several years.' The
academies were going to offer special programs, including a class entitled
"Rites of Passage," an Afrocentric curriculum, 32 career planning, an
emphasis on male responsibility, Saturday classes, individualized counseling,
and extended classroom hours.'33
The school district was sued by girls and their parents who sought a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the Board from implementing the male
academies. '34 The plaintiffs, supported by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the National Organization for Women, objected to the plan arguing
that these programs addressed issues facing all children, including females,
and did not require a uniquely male environment. '35  Furthermore, the
plaintiffs charged that despite the Academies' stated goal of addressing
special problems of urban males, like high homicide, unemployment, and
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Historically, America's educational system followed the lead of Europe in formally
educating males, but not females. For a historical perspective on education in America, see
SADKER, supra note 103, at 15-28, 230.
129. FERNANDEZ, supra note 96, at 80-81 (noting that the leading cause of death for Black
males aged fifteen to twenty-four is homicide and that more young Black men go to jail than to
college).
130. GAO, supra note 38, at 14.
131. Id.
132. Afrocentric programs emphasize African-American history and culture. Michael John
Weber, Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for African-American Males,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1099, 1100 n.11 (1993).
133. Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
134. ld. at 1005. Shawn Garrett was a Detroit mother whose four year old daughter was
to attend preschool in the Fall of 1991. Shawn Garrett voluntarily dismissed her action before
oral argument because she had been harassed by phone calls and comments from community
members. Nancy Doe and her daughters continued the suit pseudonymously. Id.
135. Id. at 1006.
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drop-out rates, the selection criteria did not specifically target "at risk"
males. "'36 Rather, the admissions policy included seven variables from
which an at-risk point value was calculated. Applicants were then separated
into three categories: high need, mid-level, and low need. One-third of the
students admitted were randomly selected from each need category.
137
Proponents of the coeducational program argued that girls had historically
been denied equal access to quality programs, and that the drop-out rate for
black girls in Detroit was only slightly behind that for black boys.'38 But
supporters of the all-male academy concept said that black girls in Detroit
still graduated at a rate twice that for boys.139 Moreover, it was suggested
that boys had more urgent needs than girls because "the boys are the ones
who end up killing each other."'40
The court applied the intermediate scrutiny test of Hogan, and found that
excluding females from the Academies was not substantially related to
achieving important governmental objectives. 4 ' The court was skeptical
of the school board's argument that the present system of coeducation had
failed male students.' Furthermore, the school board failed to show a
connection between excluding females from the Academies and improving
dropout and homicide rates among urban males.'43 Without evidence to
show that the educational system was failing males because of the presence
of females, the court granted the preliminary injunction; the case was
ultimately settled without a trial.' The court found that the plaintiffs met
their burden of showing the likelihood of success on a Title IX cause of
action.'45 Conversely, the plaintiffs did not carry that burden in alleging a
violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.'4 6 The court recog-
nized the important purpose of the Academies and even went so far as to
acknowledge the status of urban males as an "endangered species."'47 Yet,
the court found that the important purpose was "insufficient to override the
rights of females to equal opportunities.' '14
Ultimately, the Detroit School Board reached a compromise agreement
with the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Organization for
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Rogers Worthington, Milwaukee Idea Shapes a New School, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1991,
at 25.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Spencer Holland, director of the Center for the Education of the African
American Male at Morgan State University in Baltimore).
141. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1008.
144. Id. at 1014.
145. Id. at 1010.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1014.
148. Id.
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Women. 4 9  The academies are now called African-Centered
Academies, 5 ' and offer comparable programs for males and females.'
While Detroit was unsuccessful in establishing all-male academies within
the public school system, an urban middle school in the northeastern part of
the country'52 established an all-male academy within the school.'
While the academy does not single out black males for the program, about
ninety-nine percent of the school's 1,000 students are minority. The all-male
academy is one of three voluntary "magnet programs" at the school, and has
fifty-seven seventh graders enrolled.'54 Students in the academy rotate
among four classrooms where they are taught traditional middle school
subjects with an emphasis on academic success, social responsibility, and
good citizenship.'55 Students learn about culture, history, and technology,
and participate in a mentoring program where they are counseled on careers
and family issues.'56 While the school hopes to continue the all-male
academy, there are plans to begin an all-girls' program in the 1996 or 1997
school year.'57
C. Single-Gender Classes
Along with single-gender schools, single-gender classes are appearing in
public schools around the nation. In Ventura, California, two schools have
single-gender math classes especially for girls. At Ventura High School, most
girls stopped taking math after Algebra II, the highest-level math course
required for admission to a California state university.'58 Typically, less
than thirty girls would advance onto the next level of math, trigonometry."'
149. Basheda, supra note 10.
150. Id.
151. GAO, supra note 38, at 15.
152. Telephone Interview with Carlotta C. Joyner, Director, Education and Employment
Issues; Health, Education, and Human Services Division, United States General Accounting
Office, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 29, 1996). Congressman John R. Kasich, Chairman of the
House Committee on the Budget, asked the GAO to investigate and report on the major
educational and legal issues involved with public single-gender education. Mr. Kasich
specifically requested that the report include some examples of recent public single-gender
education programs. The GAO conducted its study between February and April 1996, and
reported to Mr. Kasich on May 28, 1996. It is intentional that the GAO report does not identify
the individual schools that are cited. The GAO's task was simply to survey and report on
various single-sex programs, and not determine whether or not those programs complied with
the law. Not wanting to draw attention to any programs that may have violated Title IX, the
GAO decided to keep even the school districts confidential. Thus, Ms. Joyner did not feel she
was at liberty to provide me with further details.
153. GAO, supra note 38, at 15.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Glass, supra note 12.
159. Id.
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During the 1993-94 school year, Ventura High School offered two all-girls
Algebra II classes. One year later, the number of girls choosing to enroll in
trigonometry almost doubled.'60 During the 1994-95 school year, the
school expanded all-girls classes to geometry and trigonometry.' Another
school in Ventura, a middle school, changed the name of its all-girl math
class to Math PLUS (Power Learning for Underrepresented Students). To
avoid legal challenges, the class is open to males, although none have
enrolled. 162
At Marsteller Middle School, in Prince William County, Virginia, eighth-
grade students may choose to attend single-sex classes in physics and
English. 63 After one semester in the program, Marsteller boys raised their
average language arts grades by one grade. During the same time, girls'
average science grades did not even increase by one point.'" The program
was viewed as a success and in 1995, the school board approved expanding
the program from about 100 students to as many as 300.165
D. Culturally-Based Immersion Programs
A few programs around the country have the more traditional "special
education" classes where students are segregated because of special needs.
However, these "special ed" classes of the 1990s have a new twist: cultural
awareness. Savannah-Chatham County, Georgia instituted a Heritage
Immersion pilot program in 1994 aimed at boys with special problems that
were linked to academic failure. Savannah-Chatham's program operates at
two elementary schools, for fourth and fifth graders. 66 The program is
designed for fifteen students in each school; currently, each school has twelve
students enrolled. 6 Students are eligible to participate in the heritage
classes if they meet some of the following criteria: (1) being retained at least
once between kindergarten and fourth grade; (2) being referred frequently for
disciplinary problems; (3) having high absenteeism; (4) scoring below the
25th percentile in reading or math; and (5) lacking motivation and inter-
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Lynnell Hancock & Claudia Kalb, A Room of Their Own, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1996,
at 76.
163. Eric L. Wee, School Board Approves Experiments, WASH. POST, May 4, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 2091846.
164. Girls' average scores increased four-tenths of a point. Hancock, supra note 162.
165. Wee, supra note 163.
166. The program operates at Hodge Elementary and Garrison Elementary schools. Letter
from Patrick J. Russo, Superintendent of Public Education, Savannah-Chatham County Public
Schools (Oct. 3, 1996) (on file with author).
167. THEBOARD OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, SAVANNAH-CHATHAMCOUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
THE HERITAGE IMMERSION PROGRAM, A REPORT ON 1993-94 AND 1994-95 ACHIEVEMENTS,
at 4.
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est.168
Heritage immersion participants are taught to appreciate their own
heritage and they learn about different cultures of the world. 69 Program
participants are assigned to regular fourth and fifth grade classes, where they
have the support of team-teaching.' 7 Heritage students are taught through
an interdisciplinary approach of social studies and art, and they learn conflict
resolution skills.17 '
Using the regular fourth and fifth grade classes at each site as control
groups, the county compiled quantitative data. Based on limited initial
findings, the school board believes the program is a success. 2 Heritage
participants improved attendance and improved standardized test scores in
math and reading. 73 The Heritage immersion pilot program continued
through the 1995-96 school year and is subject to approval on an annual
basis. 74
While Savannah-Chatham County is still in the preliminary phase of its
pilot program, an urban middle school' 7 already had a school-wide
Afrocentric curriculum in place when, in 1993, it began allowing students to
choose from single-gender and coeducational classes. 76 The single-gender
program focused on students' academic and social needs, and especially
targeted African American males with serious learning disabilities. 177 After
only three years, however, the single-gender classes were discontinued to
comply with the state administrative code.' 7
IV. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE PROGRAMS
Although only a small sampling of programs has been reviewed, it is
clear that single-gender educational programs can take many different forms.
While the various programs are structured differently, they share an implicit
recognition that a one-size-fits-all educational program does not serve the
needs of all students. Thus, some single-gender programs, like those in
Ventura and Marsteller, focus on improving academic performance in one
school subject. Other programs, like the single-gender high schools in
Philadelphia and Baltimore, are more broadly tailored towards either the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The regular fourth or fifth grade teacher is assisted by the heritage teacher.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 7.
175. The GAO would not identify the school. See Telephone Interview, supra note 152.
176. GAO, supra note 38, at 16.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Telephone Interview, supra note 152. The GAO would not identify the
administrative code or the state in this case.
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academic or social needs of students. Still, some programs, like the Savannah-
Chatham heritage immersion program, are integrated plans that aim to satisfy
learning needs, personal development needs, and socialization needs.
While studies and surveys are inconclusive, many people still believe that
single-sex classes and schools have some legitimate pedagogical benefits.
Proponents of single-sex education say it (1) provides choice for parents and
students; (2) reduces distractions in the classroom;.. 9 (3) gives teachers
flexibility in the way they teach; 8' and (4) enables girls to take leadership
roles and develop self-confidence.'"' Opponents of single-gender education
say it (1) creates a sheltered environment that does not prepare students for
the real world;' 2 (2) reinforces gender stereotypes or promotes sexism;8 3
and (3) may be unconstitutional.
While the Fourteenth Amendment provides the bare minimum level of
179. See Carol Kreck, A School of Their Own: Girls' Academies Proving Value of Same-
Sex Education, DENVER POST, Feb. 23, 1993, at 1E. One ninth-grade girl said that a single-sex
education allowed girls to be themselves. She said, "We don't have to worry about what the
guys would say about the way we act or dress." Such sentiments confirm research done by
Harvard education Professor Carol Gilligan. Gilligan's studies in the psychology of adolescent
girls shows that beginning at about age 11, girls' feelings of confidence and competence begin
to disintegrate. Young women become sensitive to their physical appearance which may distract
them from learning. Id.; see also Mary Challender, Separating the Girls from the Boys, DES
MOINES REG., July 15, 1995, at 1. Recalling her all-girls' high school in the 1970s, one woman
said, "No one wore makeup, there was no pretentiousness, and people wore curlers in their hair
to school. I think people felt more free to be themselves." Likewise, a young man recalling
his all-male high school said, "You didn't have to put up a pretense of maybe being something
you weren't. You could goof around and do stupid stuff." He also said, "At the all-male
school, you'd joke around with the teacher and have more interaction with the teacher. There
was more of an exchange of ideas." Id.
180. See Kreck, supra note 179. Studies show that boys and girls learn differently. Key
findings of Carol Gilligan showed that females need to feel connected to each other and to their
teachers. Id.; see also Dana Pride, Math Gap Gives Boys Advantage, NASHVILLE BANNER, Feb.
26, 1996, at Al. Many educators call for a teaching approach that accommodates girls' learning
styles. Girls are more social and verbal, so collaboration on projects is suggested. Id.; see also
Glass, supra note 12. In one all-girls' math class, students sat at tables in groups of three or
four and were able to talk and ask questions of anyone in the class. One student in an all-girls'
algebra class went from Cs to an A. In another male-only fifth grade class, the teacher got her
students" interested in reading by including sports magazines in the curriculum. By years' end,
the class was reading at grade level. Id.
181. One seventeen-year old high school student commented on her all-girls high school.
She said the school offered more leadership opportunities because the girls were forced to "step
up and take the initiative .... In student government [boys] would take the initiative and the
girls would sometimes sit back and just let the boys take control." Comment by Keila Trimble
to Jim Blair (Feb. 3, 1996), in Southern California Voices, supra note 8; see also Kreck, supra
note 179. In an all-girls school, girls run for student council president or edit the school paper,
tasks they might not undertake in a coeducational school. Id.
182. SADKER, supra note 103, at 247-50.
183. Id. at 240-41. In one all-girls' school, the teacher announced a difficult assignment
but reassured the students that "major hand-holding" would be available. In all-male
classrooms, the stereotyping and sexism takes a much different form. Classroom discussions
may sound like "locker room" talk and discussions in English literature can take on sexual
overtones. Id.; but see Glass, supra note 12. Reinforcing stereotypes is furthest from the truth
in an all-boys' class where a boy plays the part of Pocahontas; where boys take interest in
reading "Sarah, Plain and Tall"; or where boys learn that baking cookies requires math skills.
Id.
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equal protection, single-gender programs must also comply with federal
statutes. Requirements for single-gender programs under Title IX and the
EEOA are at least as stringent as those under the intermediate scrutiny test
of the Fourteenth Amendment. "' Assuming that single-gender programs
were valid pre-VMf, the VAI decision could only jeopardize them if the
intermediate standard has, in fact, been heightened. In other words, this
appears to be Justice Scalia's fear: that VMT changed the current law under
Title IX and the EEOA, invalidating those statutes. This could only be the
result if VAJ did, in fact, impose a higher form of intermediate scrutiny on
gender classifications. Given the majority opinion of VMI, Justice Ginsburg's
reassurance that the standard remains the same, and Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence, this paper presumes that single-gender programs that were valid
under Title IX and the EEOA before VMJ" remain valid after VA. "'85 .
Evaluating these single-gender educational programs in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its protections, one must remember that equal
protection does not always require that a state treat everyone equally. The
equal protection clause, in an educational context, does not mean that all
students must receive uniform treatment. In fact, equal protection may
require treating students differently in order to achieve as nearly as possible
equal educational results. Single-gender programs are aimed at achieving this
result. Students come to school with different backgrounds-social,
economic, and ethnic. Because students are not similarly situated, allowances
must be made to help them reach their maximum potential. One educator
aptly stated the dilemma:
Our schools... are centers of both the most self-centered forms of
individualism and the most banal kinds of standardization. They celebrate
mindless objectivity and simultaneously offer the grossest inequities ... We
have managed to define equity as the enemy of creativity, and thus, given
equity a bad name... It may be hard to produce both equity and good
schooling, but we will not achieve either goal any quicker if we opt for
centralization, standardization, and uniformity... Equity is an idea we are
in danger of losing these days. It has few powerful proponents. However,
the best response is to note that fairness requires such diversity .... 186
With preliminary indications showing pedagogical benefits of single-sex
education, it is prudent to allow experimentation and innovation in this
184. While intermediate scrutiny requires that gender classifications be substantially related
to important government objectives, Title IX allows gender classifications only when less
restrictive means cannot be utilized and when the same results could not be accomplished
through gender-neutral means. See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.
185. For an equal protection analysis of single gender schools and an analysis of Title IX
and the EEOA, including a legislative history, see Daniel Gardenswartz, Comment, Public
Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An Inner-City Answer? 42 EMORY L.3.
591 (1993).
186. Deborah W. Meier, Keynote Address, A Colloquium on Public Education Reform, 21
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 649, 650-51 (1995). Ms. Meier is Co-Director, Central Park
East Secondary School, Coalition Campus School Project.
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area.
A. Single-Gender High Schools
The single-gender high schools in Baltimore and Philadelphia are
examples of how single-gender schools can exist without violating the
Constitution. Like VMI, these schools have long histories as single-sex
institutions. Having been established in the 1800s, their reputations as all-girl
schools carry forward to this day. Unlike VMI, however, neither school
expressly prohibits males from applying. Both schools have high academic
standards, but neither classifies students based on gender for admission
purposes. Thus, unlike women who were flatly denied a unique educational
opportunity at VMI, students who are not admitted to either of these high
schools have other equivalent educational programs available to them.
A high percentage of the girls in the single-gender high schools of
Baltimore and Philadelphia go on to college: ninety-six percent and ninety-
eight percent, respectively. Granted, both schools begin with students who
are motivated to do well academically. In Baltimore, students must have a
B average to be accepted and a C average to remain enrolled; in Philadelphia,
students with high academic standing and good attendance records are
accepted. Without knowing whether these students would do equally as well
in a coeducational environment, they have, nonetheless, chosen to attend
female-only schools. Considering that these* students do not come from
privileged backgrounds, they should be given that choice and the opportunity
to excel.
B. All-Male Academies
The idea behind the all male academies is to focus on special needs of
adolescent boys and direct their energy and attention toward dcademic
achievement and social responsibility. As discussed earlier, however, Detroit
was stalled in its efforts to establish these institutions and modified its
program to include girls. The Detroit program could not meet the intermedi-
ate scrutiny test because it was intended to benefit males but failed to have
specific pedagogical goals when the program was conceived. On the
contrary, its stated goals were to combat high rates of homicide and
unemployment-problems that also faced young women in Detroit.
Additionally, the entrance criteria for the male academies were not what they
appeared to be. While the admissions policy fashioned an "at risk factor" and
claimed to target "at risk males," in reality, some of the males were not any
more at risk than their female counterparts in the community.
The Detroit example is very similar to the VMT" case. The most obvious
similarity is the exclusion of females. And like VMI, the Detroit School
Board justified its position on a conclusion, rather than supporting evidence.
Like Virginia, which concluded that women were ill-suited for the adversative
method of learning at VMI, the Detroit School Board concluded that males
25
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more than females were harmed by their inner city environment. The male
academies in Detroit could not pass an equal protection analysis because the
school board based its conclusions primarily on subjective sociological factors
rather than objective pedagogical factors. And the "real" differences between
young males and females in the inner city were not so different, after all.
Another problem with the Detroit proposal may have been the timing of
the phase-in of the program. While an incremental approach is generally
acceptable when implementing new programs, the school district wanted to
establish an exclusive program for males, without offering an equivalent
program for females. Furthermore, there were already plans to expand the
boys' program before even initiating a similar program for girls.
Unlike the situation in Detroit, the other (unidentified) male academy'87
was able to operate and succeed. Because the program is geared only toward
seventh graders, it is very limited. However, given these limited facts, it is
not certain whether this in-school male academy actually complies with equal
protection requirements. Although participation in the program is voluntary,
there is no information on admissions criteria. In order to fit within a Title
IX exception permitting single-gender classrooms, the school would have to
show that the boys had special educational needs that could not be met in a
coeducational classroom. Without details on the admissions criteria and
stated goals, one can only speculate about the justifications for this program.
Nonetheless, if one believes that a single-gender environment promotes a
more conducive learning environment for boys at this age, then academic
success should follow.
C. Single-Gender Classes
Of the innovative single-gender educational programs, probably the
easiest application of the intermediate scrutiny test is with the single-gender
classes. In California and Virginia, single-gender math classes, English
classes, and science classes are offered specifically to students who need extra
instruction and encouragement in these subjects.
Marsteller's program is designed to increase females' performance in
science and males' performance in English. Studies show that in middle
school, boys see science as a "male" subject, while girls view it neutrally.'88
However, by high school, both boys and girls agree that science is no longer
a neutral subject, and males clearly dominate.'89 Conversely, English is one
area where boys score lower than girls on the American College Testing
187. See Telephone Interview, supra note 152.
188. SADKER, supra note 103, at 123.
189. Id. Of all the subjects in high school, physical science is the most male dominated.
By the time students take advanced courses in high school, females take advanced biology while
males choose physics and advanced chemistry. A 1991 survey by the Council of Chief State
School Officers reported that males comprise 60% of first-year physics and 70% of second-year
physics students. Id.
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Program standardized test.'9  Clearly, pedagogical goals have been
achieved at Marsteller where test scores have improved in English and
science, for boys and girls, respectively.
Unlike VMI, where females were denied an opportunity to participate in
the adversative training method with no equivalent alternative, these single-
gender classes are voluntary and are narrowly tailored to pedagogical goals.
Students at Marsteller are not prohibited from attending certain English or
science classes; rather, they may choose to study in coeducational classes or
single-gender classes.
Likewise, Ventura has successfully met pedagogical goals by enrolling
more girls in upper-level math classes, where prior to the girls-only classes,
they were sorely underrepresented. This is unlike Hogan, where males were
denied regular admission to nursing school. In Hogan, females were already
well represented at the nursing school; in fact, they dominated the field of
nursing, nullifying the argument for affirmative action.
The Fourteenth Amendment is not violated where affirmative action is
justified. Similarly, these programs fall within the narrow affirmative action
exception to Title IX.
D. Culturally-Based Immersion Programs
In Savannah-Chatham County, strict selection criteria are used and
specific goals are formulated for students in the heritage immersion program.
The law does not prohibit classifications based on academic ability, and
programs such as Savannah-Chatham's serve special pedagogical purposes.
The culturally-based immersion program in Savannah-Chatham County is an
intensive remedial program aimed at young boys with a history of academic
failings and disciplinary problems. Again, this program is narrowly tailored
to achieve pedagogical goals and is very limited: it only has twenty-four
students enrolled.
On the other hand, in the unidentified school, all students participate in
the Afrocentric curriculum, thus, there are no classifications at all. It is
unclear why the unidentified school discontinued its single-gender classes,
especially when participation was optional. But, based on these limited facts
there was nothing to justify gender classifications.
E. Summary
Although single-sex programs may be challenged on grounds of equal
protection violations, there is enough interest across the country warranting
it least some study and experimentation. In California, Governor Pete Wilson
190. Id. at 141. The American College Testing Program, or ACT, is one college admission
test administered during high school. The test assesses academic achievement in English, math,
natural science, and reading. Girls score almost a full point higher than boys on the English
section of the test, but boys lead in the other sections. Id.
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appropriated five million dollars in the 1996-97 budget to establish twenty
single-sex schools. 9" Although there is just one such school operating in
the state, Governor Wilson's 1997-98 budget includes another five million
dollars to continue the effort.
92
Meanwhile, in New York, a publicly-funded all-girls' school opened in
September with fifty seventh graders and four teachers.'93 The Young
Women's Leadership School received more than one hundred applications and
selected students based on a formula favoring students with high scores on
achievement tests and low family incomes.' 94
Interest in single-gender education is also apparent on a national level.
Legislation was introduced in the 104th Congress that would have eased the
restrictive language in Title IX and allowed school districts to establish and
fund some single-sex pilot programs. 1 5  Senator Hutchison's proposal
acknowledged the importance of equal rights, recognized a compelling
govermment interest in assuring that all children receive a high-quality
education, and emphasized the need for parental and student choice.'96 The
legislative language pointed out that actual and threatened lawsuits, by private
organizations and government agencies, interfered with parents' rights and
limited schools' ability to undertake innovative educational programs. 197
Although Senator Hutchison's bill died, it is possible that similar legislation
could be introduced in the 105th Congress. 9
191. 1996-97 CAL. STATE BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS; see also Susan Estrich, Political Winds
Shifting: Wilson's New, Moderate Views A Model For Future Debate, USA TODAY, Jan. 11,
1996, at 11A. Governor Wilson's statewide experiment would allow the establishment of twenty
single-sex schools: ten for boys, geared toward providing positive role models to counter the
appeal of gang leaders, and ten for girls emphasizing math and science. Id.
192. Colvin, supra note 9. The single-sex academies aim to improve boys' discipline and
allow girls to learn in an environment free from competition with boys.
193. Rose Kim, Not Making the Grade? All-Girl School's Foes Fault U.S. Probe,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1997, at A20.
194. Tamara Henry, A New Push for Girls-Only Public Schools, USA TODAY, Sept. 18,
1996, ai ID.
195. Id.; see also Educational Opportunity Demonstration Act, S. 829, 104th Cong. (1996).
196. 141 CONG. REC. S6926 (daily ed. May 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) proposed legislation to facilitate educational innovation
by allowing experiments in same-sex classes and schools. The Act established an educational
opportunity demonstration program to grant waivers to (1) allow experimentation with same
gender classes for low-income, educationally disadvantaged students; (2) determine whether such
classes make a difference in the educational achievement and opportunities of individuals; and
(3) involve parents in the educational options and choices of their children. The Act directed
the Secretary of Education to waive for up to five years any statutory or regulatory requirement
of Title IX and any other law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Nothing in the
legislation would have affected efforts to overcome the effects of past gender discrimination.
Id.
197. Id. The Act would have countered threats of lawsuits from private groups and
Government.
198. Speech by John Borkowski to the Annual ABA Convention (Aug. 6, 1994), in
Speeches, Single Gender Education and the Constitution, 40 LoY. L. REV. 253, 276 (1994).
A bill similar to Senator Hutchison's had been introduced by Senator Danforth (R-Mo.) in 1994,
indicating an on-going interest in this issue.
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CONCLUSION
While Justice Scalia and other like-minded people may view the VM
decision as a threat to any single-sex school, there is no evidence of that yet.
However, the precedential value of that holding and its application to
publicly-funded single-sex primary and secondary education may not be too
far away.
The Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem is being
challenged by the New York Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil
Rights Coalition, and the National Organization for Women.'99 Relying on
the federal court's decision striking down the constitutionality of Detroit's all-
male academies, the New York civil rights groups filed a complaint against
the United States Department of Education and the all-girls' school.2"' The
groups opposing the school are asking for significant changes, including
renaming the school, restructuring the program, and actively recruiting
boys." ' While this opposition seems relatively mild, a formal court
challenge cannot be brought until a male who has been denied admission
comes forward and is willing to serve as a plaintiff. Thus far, the school
claims not to have received a single inquiry from a male.20 2
Although the Department of Education's investigation which began in
September should have been completed in four to six months, the school
district has been slow in responding to a request for documents. 20
3 Oppo-
nents of the school allege that the school district is deliberately delaying the
investigation until a comparable all-boys school can be established.20 4 In
the meantime, school officials stand by their decision to open the school and
rely on research that shows girls have unique social and educational
needs.20 5 Nonetheless, without specifying what pedagogical benefits it
hopes to achieve and how the single-sex classification is substantially related
to that goal, reliance on developmental differences between male and female
adolescents may not be enough. Like VI', where the Court was not
persuaded by Virginia's reliance on similar studies, the future of the East
Harlem school is at risk. If the intermediate scrutiny standard is applied as
it was in VIA East Harlem's reliance on differences between learning and
development needs of boys and girls may be viewed as an over broad
199. Liz Willen, No Schoolin / Rights Group Seeks to Block All-Girls Program From
Opening, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1996, at A4.
200. Michael Meyers, Schools Dodge the Law, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1996, at 14A.
201. Henry, supra note 194.
202. Willen, supra note 199.
203. Kim, supra note 193.
204. Id.
205. Henry, supra note 194.
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generalization, and not persuasive. °6
Nonetheless, contrary to Justice Scalia's belief, the future of single-sex
education is not "utterly impossible of achievement." The equal protection
clause simply requires school districts to walk a fine line. Various public
education programs around the country are proof that single-sex education can
exist within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title IX, and the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act. In fact, many of these programs do not
begin with an intent to segregate; rather, they set out to achieve a pedagogical
goal, and the effect is a program that happens to be sexually segregated. In
these cases, where the resulting byproduct is a single-gender program, equal
protection is not even an issue." 7
Conversely, where programs begin with the premise of a single-gender
classification, the difficult part of an equal protection analysis is showing how
that classification may be substantially related to achieving a pedagogical
goal. Admittedly, research in this area is sparse, study results are inconclu-
sive, and there is nothing to prove a direct correlation between single-gender
classes or schools and academic achievement." 8 However, preliminary
results from scattered programs across the nation appear to show a positive
trend. The only way to measure the success or failure of these programs,
though, is to allow them to operate so that data can be collected. Only after
these programs have been operating for a sufficient time can statistics be
compiled from which to form valid conclusions.
Viewing American education in the context of a rapidly-changing society
far removed from the 1950s, it is difficult to know where to go from here.
But as schools are increasingly looked upon to prepare young people for life,
in addition to preparing them for college and careers, it is clear that
something must be done to better serve students, and society as a whole,
through the educational process. More and more, people expect schools to
provide children with more than "book smarts."
A critical question to be answered is: Who should have the power to
decide whether single-gender schools have a place in primary and secondary
public education? It is hard not to side with tax-paying parents who want the
best quality education for their children. Similarly, if students are more
motivated to learn in a single-sex environment they should have that option.
Likewise, educators and administrators who experience first-hand the
deficiencies with the current system should be empowered to innovate and
experiment. And even if these programs become more widely accepted, there
would still be a role for national organizations like the American Civil
206. "The justification must be genuine ... [a]nd it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females."
VM, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
207. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court decided that a law,
neutral on its face, may disproportionately impact one class of people. Such an outcome,
without evidence of intentional discrimination, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
208. Borkowski, supra note 198, at 269.
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Liberties Union and the National Organization for Women. Parents, teachers,
and administrators who understand the detrimental effect of segregation when
its sole purpose is to reinforce stereotypes and feelings of inferiority would
welcome the challenge of establishing single-gender programs that serve
pedagogical goals.
Considering the many changes in our society, including advancements in
science and technology, and what we know about interpersonal relationships
and learning methods, perhaps the public school system of the not too distant
future will include single-gender schools and programs as the norm, and not
the exception. Perhaps the typical school system will offer a wide range of
programs-a mixture of single-gender schools and classes along with
coeducational institutions-from which students may choose. This is my
hope. Across the nation, from California to New York, from Michigan to
Georgia, parents, teachers, administrators and elected officials share my hope.
Contrary to Justice Scalia's warning, that single-gender education is dead, the
time is ripe for change in our schools and the manner in which we educate
our children.
Educating students and preparing them to be respectable, responsible, and
productive citizens is unquestionably an important governmental objective.
If there are pedagogical reasons for classifying students based on gender, and
the classification is substantially related to those pedagogical goals, then
under the intermediate scrutiny test, which is still the standard, single-sex
educational programs should pass constitutional muster.
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